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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
THE STATE OF UTAH
DENNIS L. WAGSTAFF,
i

Plaintiff-Petitioner,

Case No. 900436-CA

v.
i
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT
SECURITY and DEPARTMENT OF THE ]
AIR FORCE,

Category No. 7

Defendants-Respondents.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
This is a petition for a writ of review of the Industrial
Commission Board of Review's decision.
pursuant

to

Utah

Code

Ann.

Jurisdiction is proper

§35-4-10(i)(1990)

and

§78-2a-

3(2)(a)(1990).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Whether just cause was shown for Department of the Air Force's
("Air Force") termination of Wagstaff from his employment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issue whether Wagstaff was terminated for "just cause"
within the meaning of the Utah Employment Security Act is a mixed
question of law and fact, involving application of the law to a
specific fact situation.

Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(d)(1988);

Pro Benefits, Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 775 P.2d 439, 441
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).

A determination whether Wagstaff's conduct
1

was culpable is also a mixed question of law and fact. Both issues
require

application

rationality tests.

by

the court

of

the

reasonableness

and

Factual findings cannot be upheld if they are

not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the
whole record before the court.

Johnson v. Dept. of Employ.

Security, 782 P.2d 965, 968 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. §35-4-5(b)(1)(1989)
Utah Admin. R. 475-5b-102(1990)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In this appeal, Wagstaff seeks reversal of a decision by the
Board

of

Review

finding

him

disqualified

for

unemployment

compensation benefits. Wagstaff applied for benefits following his
discharge from employment at Hill Air Force Base in January 1990.
Following an initial denial of benefits by the Department of
Employment Security, Wagstaff requested a hearing. He appeared at
a hearing on March 29, 1990, where he was represented by a union
steward.

Wagstaff

was

found

eligible

for

benefits

by

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Norman Barnes, who found that Air
Force had not established just cause for his discharge.

The ALJ

found that Wagstaff's conduct involving a one time use of an
alleged controlled substance, approximately six months prior to
his removal

from service, was

insufficient

to establish the

culpability element of the just cause test.

The Board of Review,

with

entered

one

dissent, reversed

the ALJ

and

disqualifying Wagstaff from receiving benefits.
2

a

decision

The dissenting

board member opined that Wagstaff was not culpable, since his
conduct was an isolated incident of bad judgment. This appeal from
the Board's decision followed thereafter.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Dennis L. Wagstaff began his employment with Hill Air Force
Base on February 8, 1978 as a sales store checker. (Clerk's
Notation of Record

("NR"), at 44).

In subsequent years, he

received several promotions, including a promotion to his latest
position as a pneudraulic systems worker-helper in the Directorate
of Maintenance Division. (NR 44). At the time of his discharge
from employment, Wagstaff's supervisor was Lee Stephenson, who
testified at the hearing. (NR 155).

Stephenson testified that

Wagstaff "worked on a variety of aircraft components" and had a
"secret clearance."

(NR 155).

He testified that Wagstaff's

performance on the job was fully successful or above prior to June
and July of 1989 and was "probably" the same thereafter.

(NR 160).

His counsel stipulated that there was never "a specific instance
where Mr. Wagstaff did not adequately perform on the job."

(NR

160) .
According to a report prepared by the Air Force Office of
Special Investigations

(OSI), on July 27, 1989, "a source of

unknown reliability," related that Wagstaff and other employees
were using cocaine at HAFB.

(NR 38). See Addendum.

The OSI

report went on to detail further investigation of the allegation,
including an interview with Wagstaff on November 1, 1989.

(NR43).

One of the interviewers was Dennis Behm, a special agent who

3

testified at Wagstaff's unemployment hearing.

(NR 43, 143).

According to the report, "SUBJECT said he used cocaine with ACOSTA,
SHELDON, and VALDEZ during Jun-Jul 89 at a park in Clearfield, UT,
during their lunch break."

(NR 43).

At his hearing, Wagstaff

testified to reluctantly inhaling an undetermined amount of a
substance which Acosta and Sheldon said was cocaine.
191-92).

(NR 187-88,

Wagstaff denied ever having used cocaine on other

occasions and voluntarily submitted to a urinalysis. (NR 43). The
results of the urinalysis test received on December 6, 1989 "did
not identify the presence of any controlled substances." (NR 44).
Wagstaff was never charged with committing a crime. (NR 199-200).
The OSI report includes summaries of statements by other HAFB
workers regarding Wagstaff's alleged drug use. Specifically, a coworker named Acosta allegedly admitted using cocaine with Wagstaff
but "could not recall the location or the date."

(NR 38). The

other co-worker, Sheldon, allegedly "revealed he had seen SUBJECT
use cocaine in Bay 5, Building 1917, HAFB, Utah."

(NR 38).

A

third co-worker, Robert Swider, allegedly related that Wagstaff
"has used and possessed cocaine while at work..." (NR 38).

Swider

also allegedly reported that Wagstaff had smoked marijuana while
on a river trip during Memorial Day weekend 1989.

(NR 42).

The

OSI report includes a summary of an interview with Vicki Hobbs,
who

"mentioned

Sheldon..."

he

smoked marijuana

(NR 43).

with Acosta, Valdez

and

At his hearing, Wagstaff denied that he had

ever used cocaine, with the exception of the one incident in June
or July of 1989.

(NR 181).

Wagstaff also denied having used
4

marijuana on the Memorial Day weekend river trip.

(NR 186).

None

of the persons identified in the report who made allegations of
further drug use were called as witnesses by the employer.

Their

statements, as recounted by Dennis Behm and as recorded in the OSI
report, were admitted as hearsay.

(NR 142).

Included in the OSI report is a summary of an interview with
Lee Stephenson.

The report summarizes:

STEPHENSON claimed SUBJECT told his supervisor
he was nervous because SHELDON was arrested on
27 Oct 89 for cocaine use. SUBJECT feared
SHELDON would implicate him and he would
subsequently be arrested. SUBJECT told his
supervisor he was willing to talk to OSI in
order to straighten out any questions they
would have.
SUBJECT further told his supervisor that if he
was administered a urinalysis, he would fail
because he has used drugs. (NR 39).
At his hearing, Wagstaff denied ever having said to Stephenson that
he was "nervous", feared implication or arrest, or if administered
a urinalysis, would likely fail it.

(NR 182-83).

Under cross-

examination, Stephenson admitted that the statement in the report
that Wagstaff "told his supervisor that if he was administered a
urinalysis, he would
incorrect.

fail because he has used drugs..." was

(NR 195). He described the incorrect statement as a

"typographical error."

(NR 195).

On January 12, 1990, Wagstaff was served by Air Force with a
Notice of Proposed Removal.

(NR 9).

The notice states that the

action was being proposed "for the offenses of using illegal drugs
on and off government premises during work hours, and disregard of
directives."

(NR 9).

The notice is based on the OSI investigative
5

report and specifically refers to the reports of alleged drug use
by co-workers Acosta and Sheldon.

The only other basis for the

proposed action was Wagstaff's admission of alleged drug use on one
occasion during June or July 1989 while on a lunch break.

(NR 9).

On January 29, 1990, Wagstaff was served with a Decision to Remove
signed by Richard Naylor advising him of removal on January 30,
1990. (NR 6).

Also served on Wagstaff was a debarment from Hill

Air Force Base signed by Colonel William Bahter, ordering him "to
leave Hill Air Force Base immediately and never to reenter."

(NR

8).

Wagstaff's last day of work at HAFB was January 29, 1990. (NR

2).

He then applied for unemployment compensation benefits on

January 31, 1990.

(NR 1).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The Board's decision should be reversed, since the employer
failed to meet its burden of establishing just cause for its
discharge of Wagstaff. No showing of actual or potential harm was
made, and the Air Force stipulated that Wagstaff was terminated
because of its zero tolerance of drugs policy, which is not the
correct standard for unemployment compensation benefits. Air Force
did not establish substantial evidence that trust and loyalty in
Wagstaff had been affected by a remote, one-time incident involving
experimentation with a substance said to be cocaine.
The Board further erred by relying on hearsay in refusing to
apply the isolated incident exception.

The record shows that the

hearsay statements against Wagstaff were contradicted by other

6

evidence, by testimony of Air Force's own witnesses and by the
circumstances under which they were made.
There is substantial evidence that Air Force abruptly changed
its policies in September 1989, after the alleged drug incident,
to mandate removal for a first time drug offense rather than
rehabilitation as was the previous recorded policy.

Wagstaff had

no notice of this change and, therefore, lacked the knowledge
necessary to satisfy the just cause test.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE BOARD OF REVIEW ERRED IN FINDING THAT WAGSTAFF
WAS DISCHARGED BY HIS EMPLOYER FOR JUST CAUSE, SINCE
HIS CONDUCT WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY CULPABLE TO BE
DISQUALIFYING UNDER §35-4-5(b) (1) OF THE EMPLOYMENT
SECURITY ACT.
On the basis of the record established in this case, the Board
of Review found that Air Force had discharged Wagstaff from his
employment for reasons that are disqualifying under Utah Code Ann.
§35-4-5(b)(1) of the Employment Security Act.

The Act provides,

in part:
An individual is ineligible for benefits or
for purposes of establishing a waiting period:
....

(b)(1) For the week in which the claimant was
discharged for just cause... Utah Code Ann.
§35-4-5(b)(l)(1989).
In regulations adopted by the Industrial Commission, the basic
factors

establishing

just cause are set out.

culpability, knowledge and control.

They include

The ALJ and the Board of

Review found that knowledge and control had been established.
7

However, at the time of the incident on which Air Force bases the
disqualification, Wagstaff did not have knowledge of a change in
policy regarding the appropriate penalty for a first time offense
of drug use.

See Argument infra. at 19.

Since culpability is a

key element in the Board's decision, the regulations regarding this
factor are set out below in extenso;
a. Culpability
This is the seriousness of the conduct or the
severity of the offense as it affects
continuance of the employment relationship.
The discharge must have been necessary to
avoid actual or potential harm to the
employer's rightful interests. A discharge
would not be considered "necessary" if it is
not consistent with reasonable employment
practices. The wrongness of the conduct must
be considered in the context of the particular
employment and how it affects the employer's
rights.
If the conduct was an isolated
incident of poor judgment and there is no
expectation that the conduct will be continued
or repeated, potential harm may not be shown
and therefore it is not necessary to discharge
the employee.
(1) Longevity and prior work record are
important in determining if the act or
omission is an isolated incident or a good
faith error in judgment. An employee who has
historically complied with work rules does not
demonstrate by a single violation, even though
harmful, that such violations will be repeated
and therefore require discharge to avoid
future harm to the employer. For example: A
long term employee who does not have a history
of tardiness or absenteeism is absent without
leave for a number of days due to a death in
his immediate family.
Although this is a
violation of the employer's rules and may
establish just cause for discharging a new
employee, the fact that the employee has
established over a long period of time that he
complies with attendance rules shows that the
circumstance is more of an isolated incident
rather than a violation of the rules that is
or could be expected to be habitual. In this

8

case because the potential for harm to the
employer is not shown, it is not necessary for
the employer to discharge the employee, and
therefore just cause is not established. Utah
Admin. R.475-5b-102 (1990).
Air Force, as initiator of Wagstaff's separation, bears the burden
of

proving

that

Wagstaff's

conduct

rose

to

the

degree

of

culpability to provide a basis for denying unemployment benefits.
Utah Admin. R.475-5b-103

(1990);

Department of Air Force v.

Department of Employment Security, 786 P.2d 1361, 1363 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990).
The ALJ who heard Wagstaff's case correctly found that Air
Force had not established culpability.

He relied, in part, on

Champlin Petroleum Co. v. Dept. of Empl. Security, 744 P. 2d 330
(Utah Ct. App. 1987), wherein evidence was adduced that a claimant
had smoked marijuana twice a week up until his termination from
employment. The court in Champlin noted that the critical question
in a "just cause" termination is what that "cause" was.
332.

Id., at

In approving an allowance of unemployment compensation

benefits, the court noted that there was no evidence that the
claimant's work performance was anything but acceptable, despite
his admitted drug use.
supervisor

who

It noted testimony by the claimant's

"testified

unequivocally

that

Robinson was

a

satisfactory employee who had no difficulty in maintaining and
performing his job."

Id. , at 332.

There was no evidence in

Champlin that the employee had reported to work under the influence
of marijuana or had used it while on the job.

9

Like the employee in Champlin, Wagstaff's supervisor, Lee
Stephenson, acknowledged under oath that there was no evidence that
his employment performance had ever been less than satisfactory.
Despite a long period of surveillance, including the use of video
cameras, no evidence was produced that Wagstaff, in contrast to
other suspected employees, had ever used a controlled substance
while on duty. The Board's conclusion that Wagstaff's consumption,
while on a lunch break, of a substance said to be cocaine made it
"inevitable" he was under the effect of drugs when he returned to
work is pure speculation without any basis in fact.

The only

evidence offered by Air Force to establish the effect of alleged
cocaine use came in the form of testimony by Dennis Behm, a special
agent for OSI. Behm testified to having attended a "13-week basic
investigator's

course" in 1983 and to having had

"recurring

training since then, some of which centered around drugs..."
144).

(NR

He testified concerning the effects of cocaine:
The initial high lasts, oh, anywhere from 20
minutes to an hour to an hour and a half but
the residual effects remain for several hours.
(NR 145).

On cross-examination, Behm acknowledged that he was not an expert
witness and that his opinion regarding the effect of cocaine use
was derived "from articles that I've read."

(NR 146). The Board's

conclusion that it was "inevitable...that the claimant returned to
base under the influence of the cocaine..." (NR 224) is not
supported by substantial evidence.
No evidence was introduced by Air Force to show any actual
harm from Wagstaff's alleged drug use.
10

His supervisor testified

that all of his work was checked and no defects ever found.
201).

(NR

He received no "write ups" following the incident or any

suggestion that his work was unacceptable.

As the ALJ correctly

noted, "the claimant was not terminated as a result of his job
performance, his work performance had nothing to do with, with the
discharge issue..." (NR 202).
Not only was there no actual harm shown to the employer's
rightful interests, a reasonable person may properly conclude that
Air Force did not consider Wagstaff's remote one time use of an
alleged controlled substance a potential harm to its operation.
Supervisor Stephenson testified that even prior to October 27, 1989
he had knowledge that Wagstaff was allegedly involved in cocaine
usage.

Despite that claimed knowledge and despite Wagstaff's

admission on November 1, 1989, nothing was done to remove him from
his position as an aircraft mechanic. As can be inferred from the
ALJ's questioning of the employer at the hearing (NR 173) it defies
credibility
concerned

for Air Force to maintain that it was seriously

about drug impairment when it continued Wagstaff's

security clearance until January 29, 1990 and allowed him to work
on "multi-million dollar aircraft" right up to the day of his
departure.
The Board's reference to the Industrial Commission's proximal
cause

rule suggests that

it too was uncomfortable with the

remoteness of the claimed cause for discharge.

The rule provides

that when a discharge does not occur immediately after the employer
learns of an offense, "a presumption arises that there were other
11

reasons for the discharge."

Utah Admin. R. 475-5b-106 2 (1990).

The Board disposes of the presumption by concluding that Air
Force's investigation required

a great deal of time and that it

could not do anything in regard to Wagstaff's employment activity
until the process had run its course. Such is not the case, since
Air Force's own rules permit immediate removal of an employee when
it considers its interests at risk.

(NR 79).

The Board is wrong

in concluding that the presumption was overcome.

The real reason

for Wagstaff's removal from his position was not a concern that his
reluctant experimentation with an alleged controlled substance had
caused or would cause harm, but rather was the result of blind
adherence to a zero tolerance drug policy which is not the standard
for determining eligibility under the Employment Security Act and
its regulations.
Statements

by Air

Force's

representatives

at Wagstaff's

hearing further support the conclusion that actual or potential
harm from drug use was not the real motivation for discharging
Wagstaff.

In his testimony, Lee Stephenson acknowledged that one

of the critical statements in the OSI report attributed to him was
incorrect. Despite his knowledge of this error, he testified that
he relied exclusively on the OSI report in recommending removal.
He did not bother to verify any of the hearsay statements regarding
alleged drug use on base. In response to the ALJ's question as to
what

it was

about the alleged

drug use

incident

that made

Stephenson decide to take removal action, the supervisor responded:
STEPHENSON

It is, the policy to me is very clear.
It comes from the president all the way through
12

the AFLC commanders. They tell me that zero
tolerances to drugs, zero. What does zero...
(NR 161).
Further evidence of Air Force's true reasons for discharging
Wagstaff can be found in an exchange between Air Force's counsel
and Wagstaff's representative at the hearing.

Following Air

Force's stipulation that Wagstaff had always performed his job
adequately, the following exchange occurred:
CELLI

Well, then, I'm at a loss as to why you're
removing him to promote the efficiency of the
service if the service isn't suffering. Can you
explain that?

JONES

You're ta-, we're not talking about his on the job
work on an aircraft, I'm talking about loss of
confidence, trust, and his ability to maintain
a security clearance. (NR 160).

The difficulty with the Air Force's position is that it ignores the
Industrial Commission regulations requiring a showing of actual or
potential harm to the employer.1

A similar approach by Air Force

in Dept. of Air Force v. Dept. of Empl. Security, supra, and Dept.
of Air Force v. Dept. of Empl. Security. 786 P.2d 1366 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990), was rejected.

The court noted that the Industrial

Commission rules identify the legitimate interests of the employer
as

including, but not limited

to:

"good will of customers,

reputation of the business, efficiency, business costs, morale of
employees, discipline, honesty, trust and loyalty."

Utah Admin.

*Air Force's position also ignores its own policy contained in
AFR 40-790, Paragraph 32 which provides that "it must be clearly
determined whether the abuse has or may have a direct adverse
affect [sic] on job performance or some identifiable detriment to
the efficiency of the Air Force." (NR 83).
13

R. 475-5b-107 (1990).

As in the previous case, Air Force has

failed to show how Wagstaff's one indiscretion exposed it to public
notoriety or dishonor, since it appears from the record that only
a few persons ever knew of the incident involving alleged drug use.
Air Force presented no evidence that employee morale or discipline
was affected, nor did it demonstrate how its trust and confidence
were diminished. The closest Air Force Ccime to presenting evidence
on this point is in the testimony of Vincent Naylor, HAFB Section
Chief.

(NR 164).

In one of a series of leading questions, Naylor

was asked by his counsel "did you express a loss of trust and
confidence in Mr. Wagstaff..."

(NR 166).

Naylor's affirmative

response is self-serving testimony and entitled to little weight.
As it did in earlier cases, "Air Force simply argued at the hearing
that [employee's] conduct violated Air Force standards of conduct
and consequently he should be removed from employment."

Dept. of

Air Force v. Dept. of Empl. Security, 786 P.2d at 1363.
The court has also addressed whether loss of a security
clearance

is

equivalent

to

a

loss

of

license

and

disqualifying under Utah Admin. R. 475-5b-108 5 (1990).

thereby
The court

concluded in Dept. of Air Force v. Dept. of Empl. Security, supra.
at 1366, that if the claimant's conduct was not culpable, loss of
a security clearance is not disqualifying.
The Board also failed to properly apply its own regulations
which direct it to consider the offensive conduct within the
context of the particular employment and in light of the employee's
longevity and prior work record.
14

Specifically, conduct which a

reasonable person would consider "an isolated incident of poor
judgment" negates a showing of potential harm and obviates the need
for a discharge. One of the three members of the panel found that
this exception applied in Wagstaff's case.

She opined:

In my opinion, the claimant clearly used poor
judgment in "going along with the boys" in
using cocaine on one occasion during a lunch
break in June or July of 1989. Such conduct
is a matter of serious concern to the employer
which may justify substantial disciplinary
action. However, in my opinion, the employer
overreacted in discharging the claimant for
this single incident of poor judgment. The
claimant's entire career should not be
destroyed as a result of such a single
incident. (NR 239).
There is substantial evidence for finding that the "isolated
incident" exception applies in this case.

Wagstaff had been

employed at Hill Air Force Base for 12 years at the time of his
removal, during which time he had never been the subject of any
disciplinary action. His work was considered entirely satisfactory
and he had received regular promotions.

As the dissenting Board

member notes, Wagstaff voluntarily participated in a urinalysis
which produced a negative result.

Had he been a habitual drug

abuser, it seems unlikely that he would have agreed to such a test
and that the results would be negative. No evidence was presented
by Air Force to support a conclusion it was likely the conduct
would continue.
In reversing the ALJ's decision, the Board adopted Air Force's
position that actual or potential harm need not be shown in order
to deny unemployment compensation benefits. Citing the "sensitive
nature of the employer's mission" and "claimant's responsibility
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to work on multi-million dollar aircraft", the Board concluded that
it "cannot find the employer's stated policy of zero tolerance for
drug abuse to be unreasonable."
policy,

the

Board

acted

(NR 238).

contrary

to

the

By adopting such a
statute,

its

own

regulations and decided case law on the subject. This court should
not approve such a departure from established law.
POINT II
THE BOARD OF REVIEW ERRED IN BASING
DECISION ON HEARSAY EVIDENCE-

ITS

Once the remote incident of alleged drug use is removed from
this case, all that remains is hearsay evidence. Although hearsay
is admissable in an administrative proceeding, findings must be
based on a residuum of legal evidence admissable in a court of law.
Yacht Club v. Utah Liquor Control Comm. , 681 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Utah
1984).

The Board acknowledges its reliance on hearsay evidence

when it states:
The majority of the Board of Review is not
entirely persuaded that the incident of drug
usage which the claimant admits was the
isolated incident he claims it to be.
(NR
238).
A careful consideration of the record should have convinced
the Board that the hearsay in this case was entitled to no weight.
The allegations of further drug use by Wagstaff were made by
persons under close investigation for commission of crimes and who
were later arrested. Knowing that they faced criminal prosecution,
it would not be unusual for such suspects to attempt to improve
their bargaining position by cooperating with the investigation and
naming as many suspects as possible.
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The two co-workers (Acosta

and Sheldon), listed in Air Force's Notice of Proposed Removal as
having seen other drug use, were the two individuals who supplied
the alleged cocaine in June or July 1989•

Given the long period

of time that had elapsed since the one incident involving Wagstaff,
it is also quite likely that recollections of time, persons and
events would have blurred. Significantly, none of the accusers was
apparently ever confronted regarding the allegations nor produced
as a witness at the unemployment hearing.
The

OSI

investigation.

report

itself

is

not

a

model

of

criminal

One of the critical allegations against Wagstaff,

that he expressed to his supervisor a fear of taking a urinalysis
test, was admitted by the interviewee to be incorrect.

Only one

of the agents involved in the investigation appeared at the hearing
to testify concerning

its content.

One of the two hearsay

statements upon which the removal was based was recorded by agents
Charles Huyck and Joe Aguirre who never appeared at the hearing to
testify.

One of the hearsay statements by witness Hobbs that

Wagstaff had "smoked marijuana" on the weekend of October 28, 1989
was directly contradicted by the results of a urinalysis taken a
few days later on November 1, 1989. In sum, there is considerable
reason for not according any weight to the hearsay statements upon
which the Board admittedly relied in denying Wagstaff benefits.
Despite its stipulation that Wagstaff 's discharge was prompted
by its zero tolerance of drug use, Air Force too sought to use
hearsay to discredit him.

Implicit in the Board's statement that

Wagstaff's experimentation with an alleged controlled substance was
17

not an isolated incident is a finding of credibility•

Wagstaff

testified that he had never used drugs prior to the one occasion.
Air Force sought through cross-examination of Wagstaff to discredit
his statement on this point.

For example, in response to an

objection to questions regarding Wagstaff's river trip, Air Force
counsel explained:
JONES

Well, we're talking about credibility. He said
he's only used drugs once and that was the
cocaine use. And now there's, there's also
evidence that he was involved at least in the
use of marijuana. (NR 185).

At an administrative hearing, the ALJ is in the best position
to judge the credibility of a witness.

It is evident from the

ALJ's decision that he considered Wagstaff credible.

The court

should give great deference to the ALJ's finding, and not that of
the Board of Review, since he was in the best position to judge
credibility. Indeed, there is support for applying a heightened
scrutiny test when a review board reverses an ALJ's finding on
credibility.

See Fierro v. Bowen, 798 F.2d 1351, 1355 (10th Cir.

1986) (When the Secretary of Health and Human Services acting
through his appeals council overturns an ALJ decision and differs
with the ALJ's assessment of witness credibility, a reviewing court
should apply heightened scrutiny in its review.)

If Wagstaff's

testimony is accepted as credible, then the dissenting member of
the Board is correct that the alleged drug use was an isolated
incident of poor judgment.
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POINT III
JUST CAUSE WAS NOT ESTABLISHED FOR THE
DISCHARGE BECAUSE WAGSTAFF DID NOT HAVE
KNOWLEDGE OF A CHANGE IN POLICY THAT
MANDATED REMOVAL RATHER THAN REHABILITATION.
There is substantial evidence in the record that Wagstaff
could not have known of Air Force's policy on the penalty for a
first offense of drug use, despite his testimony at the hearing.
In an effort to establish the knowledge element of the just cause
test, Air Force introduced into the record a number of policies
relating to drug use.

See Addendum.

The policies do more than

establish that Wagstaff had notice of a potential penalty for drug
use. They show also that prior to September 1989, Air Force policy
was to encourage rehabilitation rather than initiate immediate
removal of a drug offender.

A document entitled "60 Day General

Notice-Air Force Civilian Drug Testing Program" issued on May 11,
1989 (NR 15) provides, in pertinent part:
We encourage any employee who has a substance
abuse problem to seek appropriate counseling
and rehabilitation assistance. Employees who
voluntarily identify themselves as having an
illegal drug problem within the time frames
established by the program, seek counseling,
or rehabilitation, agree to a last chance
agreement and refrain from using illegal drugs
will not be subject to disciplinary action.
(NR 16).
Assuming that Wagstaff's voluntary admission of drug use and his
taking of a urinalysis qualifies him as "an employee who has a
substance

abuse

rehabilitation,

problem",
not

the

Air

Force

initiation

should
of

have

provided

immediate

removal.

Attachment 3 to AFR 40-750, dated July 23, 1982, reflects Air Force
19

policy and recommends for a first offense of using a dangerous
drug:

"Reprimand to 5 Day Suspension."

(NR 77).

Attachment 5 to

that policy statement under the heading "Drug or Alcohol Abuse"
directs that the contemplated disciplinary action be postponed for
a reasonable time to allow an employee identified as having a drug
abuse problem to enroll in an approved rehabilitative program. (NR
79).

AFR 40-750 §16b(2) provides that:
Normally, a progression of disciplinary
measures is taken in an effort to rehabilitate
an employee before management decides to
remove the individual. (NR 74).

Subsection lid of Attachment 3 directs that "[t]he penalty selected
should consider the offender status as an experimenter, user or
addict and should, whenever possible, contribute to his or her
rehabilitation and recovery."

(NR 77).

It is clear from Air Force's own introduced policies that
rehabilitation and a progression of disciplinary measures was once
the norm.

That standard changed abruptly following President

Bush's declaration of a war on drugs in his televised September
1989

speech.

On

September

18, 1989, in response

to the

President's speech, U.S.A.F. Commander Alfred G. Hansen issued a
memorandum urging all Air Force logistics commands to increase
their efforts to eliminate drug abuse.

(NR 48).

In response to

General Hansen's memorandum, Lt. Gen. McCoy at Wright-Patterson Air
Force Base issued a memorandum, dated September 29, 1989, to all
AFLC Commanders interpreting General Hansen's policy statement as
a "zero tolerance for drugs and employees who abuse drugs..." (NR
47).

He further stated, in part:
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[I]t may be appropriate to initiate removal
action against a first time drug offender,
even though AFR 40-750 currently suggests no
more than a five day suspension. (NR 47).
In response to Lt. Gen. McCoy's memorandum, Maj. Gen. James
W. Hoff, Commander at HAFBf issued a memorandum on November 20,
1989 strongly endorsing the new policy and stating, among other
things:
I expect increased efforts on the part of all
concerned to ensure that all available
measures are taken to wage this war on drugs,
to include criminal prosecution and the most
severe administrative discipline which in most
cases will lead to removal from Air Force
employment. (NR 46).
It is clear from the above that a new and more severe policy
in regard to drug use was instituted in September 1989. Since the
incident for which he was discharged took place in June or July,
1989, Wagstaff had no notice that the Air Force policy in regard
to drug use had changed.

Therefore, the knowledge element of the

just cause test was not met.

The evidence shows a dramatic shift

by Air Force in the way in which it approached drug abuse,
following the September speech by President Bush. Had the isolated
incident in Wagstaff's career come to light prior to September
1989,

it

is

likely

that

he

would

have

received

the

same

rehabilitative approach as is recommended in Air Force policies.
There is, in fact, evidence in the record that earlier,
equally serious offenses, such as being drunk on duty and attempted
possession of illegal drugs, resulted in suspension, not removal.
Industrial Commission regulations direct that an employer's failure
to uniformly apply reasonable standards to all employees when
21

instituting disciplinary action negatives a finding of just cause
for discharge. Utah Admin. R. 475-5b-101 (1990).
failure

to

accord

Wagstaff

the

same

The Air Force's

treatment

as

others

demonstrates the arbitrary and capricious nature of its actions and
provides further support for reversal of the Board of Review's
decision.
CONCLUSION
Not every cause for discharge provides a basis to deny
eligibility for unemployment compensation.

Champlin Petroleum v.

Dept. of Empl. Security, 744 P.2d at 333.

It is doubtful in this

case that Air Force had a sufficient factual basis to discharge
Wagstaff, given its own policies; it is certain the Board of Review
did not have a reasonable basis in law and fact to deny him
unemployment compensation benefits.

The court should reverse the

Board and order reinstatement of the ALJ's decision.
Respectfully submitted this ,:>o»'

day of October, 1990.

UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
Attorney for Plaintiff-Petitioner

MICHAEL E. BULSON
Attorney at Law
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SYNOPSIS
1-1. ^On 27 Jul 89, 0C-1T, a source of unknown reliability, related that
SUBJECT and other Directorate of Maintenance employees, specifically, NEVIN
SHELDON, JAMES VALDEZ, and LEWJS SAVAGE were using cocaine in Bay 5, Bldg
1917, HAFB, UT.' On 27 Oct 89, ACOSTA admitted to using cocaine with SUBJECT;
however, he could not, recall the location or the date. /SHELDON revealed he
had seen SUBJECT use cocaine in Bay 5, Bldg 1917, HAFB, *OT.'^yOn 30 Oct 89,^
SUBJECT advised his supervisor he was concerned about the arrests made on 27
Oct 89. wC)n 1 MovtK89,. SUBJECT admitted using cocaine with JAMES^ACOSTA,^
Directorate of Maintenance enployee, SHELDON, VALDEZ, and SAVAGE." SUBJECT
subsequently consented to an examination of his urine which was submitted to
the Air Force Drug and Testing Laboratory, Brooks AFB, TX.
SUBJECT'S
girlfriend revealed he had told her he had used cocaine in the past; however,
he has since wanted to straighten out his life and not be involved in the use
of drugs. 'ROBERT SWIDER, SUBJECT'S coworker, related SUBJECT has used and
possessed cocaine while at work, specifically Bay 5, Bldg 1917T SUBJECT'S
urine sample did not reveal the presence of any controlled substances.
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BACKGROUND
^2-1.
This investigation was based on information received from OC-1 that
SUBJECT and coworkers were using cocaine in Bay 5, Building 1917.
NARRATIVE
Confidential Source Information

J

3-1. On 27 Jul 89/ OC-1, a source of unknown reliability, related SUBJECT
was using cocaine with NEVIN SHELDON, Subject of AFOSI case number
8914D17-3996, JAMES VALDEZ, Subject of AFOSI case number 8914D17-3997, and
LEWIS SAVAGE, Subject of AFOSI case number 8914D17-4000. The cocaine was
being used in Bay 5, Building 1917, Hill AFB (HAFB) , UT. It was unknown to
OC-1 if SUBJECT was providing* the cocaine.
Witness Interviews
3-2. INTERVIEW OF: LEE STEPHENSEN, SUBJECT'S Supervisor
DATE/PLACE OF INTERVIEW: 27 Oct 89/Telephonic
INTERVIEWER: SA JOE M. AGUIRRE
STEPHENSEN claimed SUBJECT told his supervisor he was nervous because SHELDON
was arrested on 27 Oct 89 for cocaine use.
SUBJECT feared SHELDON would
implicate him and he would subsequently be arrested.
SUBJECT told his
supervisor he was willing to talk to OSI in order to straighten out any
questions they would have.
SUBJECT further told his supervisor that if he was administered a urinalysis,
he would fail because he has used drugs.

y

3-3. INTERVIEW OF: GREGORY ACOSTA
DATE/PLACE OF INTERVIEW: 27 Oct 89/Bldg 1917, HAFB, UT
INTERVIEWERS: SA CHARLES HUYCK, DEA
SA AGUIRRE
After rights advisement, ACOSTA initially denied having used or possessed
cocaine or any other controlled substances while working on HAFB, UT.
Subsequently, ACOSTA admitted to using cocaine approximately four months prior
while at a party; however, it was with persons other than DoD civilian
employees. ACOSTA declined to provide names of people who he used cocaine
with or the name of the individual that provided the cocaine.
After ACOSTA was shown a segment of a video, he bowed his head and said,
"Shit, I'm fucked." ACOSTA admitted he provided the cocaine which which was
used by SHELDON, VALDEZ, and himself on 18 Oct 89. ACOSTA further admitted to
providing and using cocaine with SHELDON and VALDEZ while at work in the past.
When asked what he used to crush the cocaine with on 18 Oct 89, he said he
used a fingernail clipper, which was in his pocket. Approximately one month
ago, VALDEZ and he used cocaine in VALDEZ's van while at work.
ACOSTA
provided the cocaine on this occasion also. w ACOSTA also used cocaine with
SAVAGE and SUBJECT during work hours; however, they were not on HAFB, UT. He
could not recall the dates, where they used at, or how long ago it was.

8914D17-4001

ACOSTA claimed during Aug/Sep 89, SHELDON told him he and SAVAGE used cocaine
while at his (SHELDON'S) ^residence in Layton, UT.
ACOSTA denied having
knowledge were SHELDON or SUBJECT got the cocaine. ACOSTA further denied ever,
charging or selling cocainfe to SHELDON or VALDEZ. He always offered to share
cocaine he purchased.
ACOSTA purchased two one-quarter gram bindles of cocaine from GILBERT MADRIL,
Salt Lake City {SIC), UT the day before (17 Oct 89). This was the cocaine
they used on 18 Oct 89 while at work. G. MADRIL was described as an hispanic
male, 40-42 years.,, old, 5,7,t~5,9,l/ 150-160 lbs, black hair, brown eyesf
moustache, semi-bald, and occasionally grew a goatee.
JERRY MADRIL, G.
MADRIL*s brother and manager of a hotel located next door to Dusty1 s Van and
Car lot, SLC, UT, also sells cocaine. ACOSTA denied purchasing cocaine from
him. ACOSTA usually purchased 1/4 to 1/2 grams; of cocaine at a time for
$40.00. ACOSTA has seen G. MADRIL possess a couple of eight balls (1/8 ounce)
of cocaine in the past.
He began purchasing cocaine from G. MADRIL
approximately nine months ago.
ACOSTA usually visited G. MADRIL around
1700-1800 hrs in the evenings when he was interested in purchasing cocaine.
It was unknown to ACOSTA if J. or G. MADRIL ever sold cocaine to any other DoD
civilian employees or USAF members. Since ACOSTA has known G. MADRIL, he has
not known of him having outside employment. ACOSTA denied knowing- I^DRIL's
supplier, however, he knew J. and G. MADRIL sold to other individuals (NFI)«
It was unknown to ACOSTA if MADRILfs other customers were DoD civilian
employees or USAF members.
ACOSTA denied having knowledge of any other employees at his work section, DoD
civilian employees, or any USAF members that were involved in any use,
possession, or distribution of any controlled substances.
3-4. INTERVIEW OF: JAMES T. VALDEZ
INTERVIEWERS: SA JOHN MESKEL
VICTOR SAHUKLAS, US Marshal Service, SLC, UT
OTHERS PRESENT: SA RAY CONNOLLY
After advisement of rights, VALDEZ stated he has worked at his current job for
about four and a half years, and he met ACOSTA on the job. They normally took
breaks at 0900 hrs or 1400 hrs daily. When first asked about drug use or
possession, he denied any knowledge of drug-related activities. VALDEZ was
allowed to view a videotape showing his apparent use of cocaine. VALDEZ
stated he snorted cocaine about five times, all within the last six months.
When asked for specifics, he said three and then said five times. He stated
he didn't pay for the cocaine and did not know v^ere it came from. ACOSTA and
SHELDON were the only ones present when he used. He has never used "crack
cocaine11 and he doesn't smoke or drink. When asked about prior use of drugs,
he said he had smoked "dope" a long time ago. He admitted he knew there were
laws against the use and possession of drugs, but stated he didn't know about
any Air Force policy concerning drugs.
He denied paying for the cocaine
saying ACOSTA just provided it, and didn't know where ACOSTA got it from.
ACOSTA would lay out the cocaine since it was his.
Once when LEE, his
supervisor, walked in on them, he thought he would quit using, but knew it
would be hard to quit. It would take a lot of effort and devotion to quit.
He said the last time he used cocaine was about a week and a half ago. When
asked if he had ever us^. -.nv in his car, he motioned no with hi- head;
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however, he eventually admitted ACOSTA had once snorted cocaine in his v^n.
He said ACOSTA used a cassette that was in the van to put it on, and used a
dollar bill to snort it*
3-5. INTERVIEW OF: NEVIN J. SHELDON
DATE/PLACE OF INTERVIEW: 27 Oct 89/Bldg 1917, HAFB, OT
INTERVIEWER: SA DENNIS BEHM
SA RON FLINDERS, Utah State Corrections/Investigations
After rights advisement, SHELDON provided the following:
During the past
year, he used cocaine about 20 times. About six of those times were while at
work on HAFB, UT. THe first time he used cocaine at work was about five to
six months ago. Most of the cocaine he used was given to him by ACOSTA. When
ACOSTA had cocaine he would usually offer to share it with the people he was
with.
In return, they would share cocaine with him when they had cocaine.
SHELDON said occasionally other people in his section would use cocaine while
at work. -The other people SHELDON saw use cocaine at work were LOU SAVAGE,
BOB SWIDER, VALDEZ, ACOSTA and SUBJECT, SHELDON stated in addition to the
cocaine ACOSTA gave him, he purchased cocaine from ACOSTA approximately four
or five times. SHELDON didn't know vshere ACOSTA obtained the cocaine. When
he purchased the cocaine, he would go to ACOSTA1 s house located about 7th East
and between 3100 and 3200 South in SLC, UT. He would pay ACOSTA $100.00 for
1/16 of an ounce of cocaine. SHELDON said he would get about 15 lines (term
for unit dosage) for that amount. Usually when SHELDON purchased cocaine from
ACOSTA, he would share a couple of lines with him. SHELDON said the last time
he was at ACOSTA1 s house was about two months ago. During that visit, both he
and ACOSTA used cocaine. SHELDON said the last time he used cocaine was on
Friday night about two weeks ago while he and VALDEZ were at the Norwood (a
nightclub in SLC, UT). He had some cocaine which he obtained from VALDEZ and
shared it with him. Subsequent to this interview, SHELDON consented to a
search of his work area and his privately owned vehicle.
3-6. INTERVIEW OF: LEWIS SAVAGE
DATE/PLACE OF INTERVIEW: 2f Oct 89/AFOSI Det 1404
INTERVIEWERS: SA AGUIRRE
SA JIM JEROME
After advising SAVAGE the interview was voluntary and could leave at any time,
he provided the following information: SAVAGE related that on every occasion
he used cocaine with ACOSTA or VALDEZ, VALDEZ provided the cocaine. On one
occasion five months ago, he snorted cocaine in Bay 5, Bldg 1917• SAVAGE
purchased the cocaine from a Roduck's (a nightclub in Ogdenf UT) patron (NFI).
Occasionally, he would provide cocaine for ACOSTA and VALDEZ. SAVAGE recalled
he used cocaine with VALDEZ approximately three to four months ago at a party
in Ogden, UT. SAVAGE could not recall the name of the person who hosted the
party. About four months ago, VALDEZ and other people (NFI) used cocaine at
his (SAVAGE'S) residence. SAVAGE did not know who provided the cocaine during
that occasion. SAVAGE said he only used with ACOSTAf SHELDON, and VALDEZ.
Approximately two months ago, he used cocaine with VALDEZ and ACOSTA while at
a party in SLC, UT. The cocaine was provide by someone (NFI) at the party.
In Aug 89, SAVAGE purchased cocaine at Roduck's Bar and Grill, Ogden, UT. He
used cocaine and gave some to VALDEZ and ACOSTA who also used it. On several
other occasions, SAVAGE used cocaine with ACOSTA while at parties held in SLC,
UT; however, he did not know who hosted the oartv or orovided the cocaine.
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SAVAGE further related SHELDON moved into his trailer in Layton, UT, during
Jun-Jul 89, but moved out approximately two weeks ago. SAVAGE used cocaine
with SHELDON on two occasions during Jul 89. SAVAGE provided the cocaine on
one occasion. r SAVAGE purchased approximately one gram of cocaine from a
Roduck patron (NFI). On the second occasion, SHELDON provided the cocaine.
SAVAGE did not know where SHELDON got the cocaine. SAVAGE related the la3t
time he used cocaine was approximately two weeks ago. He purchased one gram
of cocaine from an unknown Roduck1s patron and snorted the entire gram
himself. He claimed he was depressed because his girlfriend recently moved to
Washington State.
He denied using cocaine or any other controlled substances with SUBJECT or
having knowledge of any other DoD civilian employees or USAF members that were
involved in illegal drug use.
3-7. INTERVIEW OF: ROBERT SWIDER
DATE/PLACE OF INTERVIEW: 29 Nov 89/AFOSI Det 1404
INTERVIEWER: SA BEHM
After advising SWIDER the interview was voluntary, he provided the following
information: SWIDER stated he had used marijuana and cocaine in the past, but
had quit using drugs about eight months ago. He admitted using cocaine around
Memorial Day 1989, with JIM VALDEZ (ref 8914D17-3997) and NEVIN SHELDON (ref
8914D17-3996) in the back of Bay 5, Building 1917, HAFB, UT.
This occurred
while all three were on duty. He also provided information about a rafting
trip he went on with SHELDON, LEWIS SAVAGE (ref 8914D17-4000) and SUBJECT
around Memorial Day 1989. While on the trip, all four chipped in money and
purchased one-fourth ounce of marijuana. They smoked the marijuana while on
the trip.
SWIDER thought SAVAGE had purchased the marijuana from JAMES
FOURNIER (ref 8914D17-3934). SWIDER opined everyone who did drugs in Building
1917 had been caught during a recent OSI operation and subsequent interviews.
He was not aware of anyone else in Building 1917 involved in the unlawful use
of narcotics.

1986 Toyota Celica, 769-ATS, UT
1986 Toyota Truck, 8258-CA, UT
DATE OF SEARCH: 1 Nov 89
SEARCH CONDUCTED BY: SA's AGUIRRE and BEHM
PLACE:

A search of SUBJECT'S vehicles by AGUIRRE and BEHM did not reveal the presence
of any controlled substances or drug paraphernalia.
3-8.

Interview of: VICKI HOBBS, SUBJECT'S girlfriend
Date/Place: 1 Nov 89/AFOSI Det 1404
Interviewers: SA Aguirre/SA Behm

HOBBS related when she first met SUBJECT approximately eight months ago, he
admitted to using marijuana.
SUBJECT stated HOBBS he usod marijuana while
attending high school.
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During the weekend of 28 Oct 89, SUBJECT mentioned he smoked marijuana with
ACOSTA, VALDEZ, and SHELDON, however did not give HOBBS any specifics.
SUBJECT feared being involved with the authorities since ACOSTA, VALDEZ, and.
SHELDON were arrested on 57 Oct 89. He did not mention any other drugs to
HOBBS.
HOBBS claimed SUBJECT was seeing a doctor for headaches.
some pain medication.

He was prescribed

Since living with- 8UBJBCT, HOBBS denied ever seeing SUBJECT using cocaine or
any other illegal drugs. HOBBS further claimed she owned Intermountain Auto
and worked with Ogden Police Department. HOBBS stated it would have been to
risky to condone any drug use by SUBJECT.
She would possibly lose her
business.
HOBBS could not provide
possession.
CRIME SCENE SEARCHES

any

further

information

on

SUBJECT'S

use

or

3-9. On 1 Nov 89, SUBJECT executed a Consent to Search and Seize, AF Form
1364, for the search of his personally owned vehicle and body fluids,
specifically urine.
URINALYSIS SEARCH
3-10. SUBJECT provided a sample of his urine. This urine was obtained under
controlled conditions by SAfs AGUIRRE and JIM JEROME in Building 1219, AFOSI
Det 1404. On 2 Nov 89, SUBJECT'S urine sample was submitted to the Air Force
Drug and Testing Laboratory (AFDTL), Brooks AFB, TX.
SUBJECT Interview
3-11. DATE/PLACE OF INTERVIEW: 1 Nov 89/AFOSI Det 1404
INTERVIEWERS: SA AGUIRRE
SA BEHM
After advising SUBJECT that the interview was voluntary, he stated the
following information: SUBJECT said he used cocaine with ACOSTA, SHELDON, and
VALDEZ during Jun-Jul 89 at a park in Clearfield, UT, during their lunch
break. ACOSTA passed a paper bindle which contained cocaine to VALDEZ. VALDEZ
then laid the cocaine on the dashboard in ACOSTA1 s car. Both ACOSTA and
VALDEZ snorted the cocaine off the dashboard.
VALDEZ took the remaining
amount of cocaine and passed it to him and SHELDON. SHELDON and SUBJECT also
used the dashboard in ACOSTA's car to snort a line of cocaine. WAGSTAFF did
not know where PCOSTA got the cocaine. SUBJECT denied ever using cocaine on
any other occasion with ACOSTA, VALDEZ, or SHELDON. He had never used cocaine
with SAVAGE.
SUBJECT denied having knowledge of any other DoD civilians or USAF members
that were involved in the use or distribution of cocaine.
LABORATORY ANALYSIS
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Urinalysis Test Results
4-1. .On 6 Dec 89, a review of urinalysis report received from AFDTL, Brooks
AFB, TX, revealed SUBJECTS urine sample provided on 1 Nov 89, did not
identify the presence of any controlled substances. A copy of the urinalysis
report is being maintained within the investigative case file.
OTHER INVESTIGATIVE ASPECTS
Law Enforcement Records. Review
5-1. On 6 Nov 89, a review of Utah Bureau Criminal Infomiation (UBCI) records
revealed the following information:
1.
Driving Under the Influence (DUI)/Drugs, 16 Jul 87, Ogden City
Police Department, Ogden, UT, Convicted: $350.00 fine, 2 months jail
(suspended).
A review of Defense Criminal Investigative Index (DCII) and Interstate
Identification Index (III) records did not reveal any further derogatory
information on SUBJECT.
Personnel Records Review
5-2. On 13 Nov 89, review of SUBJECT personnel file on file at the Civilian
Personnel Office, Records Section, HAFB, UT, revealed the following
information:
SUBJECT initially entered US Civil Service on 8 Feb 78 as a Sales Store
checker. SUBJECT was assigned to the Air Force Commissary Service, HAFB, UT.
On 16 Mar 80, he was promoted to Material expeditor, Directorate of
Distribution. On 23 Aug 81, he was moved to the Directorate of Maintenance,.
Pneudraulic Systems worker-helper.
On 16 Sep 84, he was promoted to his
present position of Pneudraulic Systems Mechanic. SUBJECT had no breaks in
service since he was initially hired.
INVESTIGATIVE/PROSECUTIVE STATUS
6-1. Closed. On 3 Nov 89, BRUCE LUBBCK, Assistant US Attorney, SLC, UT,
advised if the information obtained during witness interviews and SUBJECT'S
admission was sufficient to dismiss SUBJECT, he would not pursue any further
action throught the US District Court, SLC, UT. LUBECK reconroended SUBJECT'S
case be taken up with the US Magistrate's Court, Ogden, UT
On 10 Nov 89, NICK ANGELIDES, US Attorney Special Assistant, advised he would
present SUBJECT'S case before the US Magistrate, Ogden, UT.
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suiter 60-Day G e n e r a l N o t i c e - A i r Force C i v i l i a n Drug T e s t i n g Program
^ A l l Air Force C i v i l i a n

Employees

The

Civilian Drue Tesning Program which is pending implementation,
program will be implemented no sooner than 60 cays from the date or
this notice.
2. The Air Force program is aimed at identifying illegal drug users
in order to maintain a safe and secure workplace and to more
efficiently operate the Federal government for the benefit oi
)f all
Americans. The determination that an employee uses illegal drucs
may be made on the oasis of direct observation, a criminal
conviction, the* employee's own admission, other appropriate
administrative determination, or by a confirmed positive ur:.nalvsis,
While the Air Force will assist employees with drug problems;
h it
muse be recognized that employees who use illegal drugs are
orimarilv responsible for chancino their behavior.
3. The Air Force program authorizes the testing of employees for
the illegal use of drugs under the following conditions:
a. When there is a reasonable suspicion that any employee uses
illegal drugs.
b. In an examination authorized by the Air Force regarding an
accident or unsafe practice.
c. As part of or as a follow-up to counseling or
rehabilitation for illegal drug use.
d. When an employee volunteers for testing, his or her name is
placed in the pool for random selection.
e« In addition, certain designated employees, who occupy or
are selected for testing designated positions, will be subject to
the random testing program. Employees in these special testing
categories will receive specific written notice, at least 30 days
before random selection, along with a detailed explanation-Q4r the
1
program, as it relates to them.
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4. All specimens wix_ oe tested at an approved w^ntract facility,
using state-of-the-art procedures. Before a positive test result
can be verified, two separate and different test procedures are
performed on the same specimen and both results must be positive.
The first test procedure used is an immunoassay and the second
confirmatory procedure is gas chromatograph-mass spectrometry
(GC/MS). The screening levels are sufficiently conservative to
eliminate extraneous reasons for a positive result, and with
confirmation -by an additional and different test method, the
chemical test results are reliable and accurate. Individual
privacy will be allowed during the collection of the specimen;
however, employees will be observed if there is reason to believe
the specimen will be altered. The Air Force has developed strict
chain of custody procedures to ensure the validity of the
specimen tested in accordance with the Department of Health and
Human Services Technical Guidelines. Any tested employee will be
given an opportunity to provide evidence-to verify the legitimate
use of prescription drugs authorized by a physician or medical
officer to the Medical Review Officer (MRO).
5. Strict confidentiality will be provided to the employee when
the confirmee positive test result is verified by the MRO.
Positive test results verified by the MRO. may only be disclosed to
the employee, the appropriate management officials responsible for
counseling and rehabilitation assistance, the appropriate
management officials necessary to process an adverse action
against the employee, a court of law, or an administrative
tribunal in any adverse personnel action. All medical and
rehabilitation records in a Rehabilitation Program will be deemed
confidential "patient" records and may not be disclosed without
the prior written consent of the employee.
6. While the Air Force cannot tolerate the use of illegal drugs,
we encourage any employee who has a substance abuse problem to
seek appropriate counseling and rehabilitation assistance.
Employees who voluntarily identify themselves as having an illegal
drug problem wi thin'fch-e-timeframes-established by the Program,
seek counseling, or rehabilitation, agree to a last chance
agreement and refrain from using illegal drugs will not be subject
to disciplinary action. However, if an employee is otherwise
determined to use illegal drugs, he or she will be subject to
disciplinary action, including possible removal from Federal
service. Once this program is implemented, removal action will be
proposed for any employee receiving a second positive test,
refusing to obtain counseling or rehabilitation after having been
found to use illegal drugs, or adulterating or substituting a
specimen.
7. The Air Force program is very ambitious and requires the
support, understanding, and cooperation of all employees. We
fully appreciate that this is a highly sensitive issue and want to
assure you that the program has been designed with the utmost
concern for maintaining"each individual's privacy and dignity. The
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importance of the challenge of creating a drug-free Air Force
cannot be overstated. We ask your complete professional and
personal dedication to achieving a drug-free workplace. For more
detailed guidance, you are encouraged to direct any questions to
your supervisor or the Central Civilian Personnel Office staff.
FCR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

r^DRA G. GRESE
Chief, Benefits and Entitlements
Division
Directorate of Civilian Personnel
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S«ctioa A—Gf neral Information
1. Air Fort* Policy:
a. Commanders must maintain a constructive,, disciplined work environment in which both management and
employees recognize and carry out their responsibilities,Y
h. Necessary disciplinary action or adverse action is
taken without regard to marital status, political affiliation
except as required' by law, race, color, religion, sex,
national origin, or age. „ Adverse action based on an
employee's physical or mental handicap is not taken
when the employee can effectively perform assigned
duties,
c. Disciplinary action or adverse action is taken only
when necessary and then -promptly and equitably. The
purpose of disciplinary action is to correct and rehabilitate the offender, if possible. Penalties must not be
disproportionate to offenses and are applied as consistently as possible considering the
particular
circumstances of the cause(s) for disciplinary action.
d. Disciplinary actions and adverse actions arc personal matters and are carried out in private (see paragraph 29).
2, Terms Explained* The following terms are included
for general guidance. The terms overlap, and more than
one may apply to an action. Regulatory definitions,
where applicable, and further explanation of these terms
are provided by the central civilian personnel office
(CCPO) upon request.
su Adyerse Action. A removal, suspension,, furlough
for 30 days or less, or reduction in grade or pay.
Actions resulting from reduction in force arc not
included. Adverse actions may or may not be for
disciplinary reasons (see paragraph 10).
b. Bargaining Unit Employee. An employee included
in an appropriate bargaining unit for which a labor
organization has been granted exclusive recognition.
c. Cause of Actioa. A recognizable offense against the
employee-employer relationship such as a violation of
rule, regulation or procedure; employment-related
off-duty
misconduct;
failure
to
fulfill
an
employment-related agreement; or a mandatory requirement to take an actiqn personal to an employee. It is
disciplinary if it results from delinquency or misconduct
by the employee. (A disciplinary cause of action is also
called an offense.) It is nondisciplinary if it results from
the employee's disability, the employee's declination of
functional transfer, or a management determination such
as reclassification of the employee's position or termination of an extended temporary promotion- A cause of
action cannot support a disciplinary or adverse action
unless it is included in appropriate notices (see r below).
d. Charge. Sometimes used to refer to the reason
stated in notices of proposed action and of final decision
when the reason is disciplinary.
e. Counseling. A nondisciplinary method to provide

i

information, instruction, guidance, advice, assistance, or
encouragement It is not to be confused with the oral
admonishment which is disciplinary.
f. Days. Days means consecutive calendar days,
including holidays, weekends, and other nonduty days.
g. Disciplinary Action. An action taken by-management to correct an employee's delinquency or
misconduct.
Included
are
oral
admonishments,
reprimands, suspensions, removals and, in some cases,
reductions in grade or pay. Some disciplinary actions
are also adverse actions.
h. Furlough, A nondisciplinary action placing an
employee in a temporary nonduty and nonpay status
because of lack of work or funds or for other
nondisciplinary reasons. A furlough is an advene action
if it is for a period of 30 calendar days or less and is
based on a decision of an administrative officer (see paragraph 16). A furlough for more than 30 calendar days is
a reduction-in-force action covered by FPM Chapter
351 and AFR 40-351, Reduction in Force, Transfer of
Function and Out-Placement Assistance.
i. Grade. A level of classification under a position
classification system.
j . Harmful Error. An error by management in the
application of its procedures which, if corrected or
alleviated, might have resulted in a different conclusion.
k. Nexus. A reasonable connection or factual relationship between the reason(s) for the action taken and
the efficiency of the service.
1. Nondisciplinary Adyerse Action. An adverse action
that is taken for reason(s) other than to correct an
employee's delinquency or misconduct.
COL Offense. A cause of action which is due to
delinquency or misconduct by an employee (see paragraph c).
n. Oral Admonishment. A disciplinary discussion
between a management official who has authority to take
disciplinary action and an employee subject to that
authority in which the employee is informed that he or she
has been disciplined by receipt of an oral admonishment It
is a disciplinary action which is not an adverse action
(see paragraph 13).
o. Pay. The rate of basic pay fixed by law or administrative action for the position held by an employee.
p. Preponderance of the Eridence* That degree of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind, considering
the record as a whole, might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion that the matter asserted is more likely
to be true than not true.
q. Prior Offense, A prior cause of action for which a
disciplinary penalty has been imposed (see paragraph
39).
r. Reason. Includes the current cause or acuon ana
facts, circumstances, and considerations relied on to
support the.action (for example, prior offenses).
a. RemoraL An involuntary separation of &n
employee from Air Force employment. It terminates
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explanations he or she may offer. It is . ^quired that the
employee's answer to a proposed reprimand be considered
according to paragraph 31. If the employee raises questions which the supervisor must resolve before making a
decision or if the supervisor needs time to consider the
employee's answer, additional time should be taken. In
such cases, advise the employee that a decision on the
matter will be made as promptly as possible and that the
employee will be advised of the decision.
(5) Determine what action is appropriate:
(a) If the discussion satisfactorily resolves the
matter, tell the employee* No further action is
necessary.
(b) If the discussion does not satisfactorily
resolve the matter and the 'supervisor decides that an
oral admonishment is adequate penalty under the
circumstances, take the stepS" dutlinc*d in paragraphs
13d(5)(b) through (7).
(c) If the discussion does not satisfactorily
resolve the matter and the supervisor decides that a
reprimand might be warranted, tell the employee that
the matter is not resolved and that he or she will be informed of the final decision in the near future.
(d) If, after discussion with the CCPO, the
supervisor decides to reprimand the employee, prepare a
'Notice of Reprimand* and coordinate it with the
CCPO before delivering it to the employee. This notice
is required See paragraphs 19e and f concerning the notice
contents.
(e) Note the reprimand on the AF Form 971.
This notation is required according to paragraph a(l).
(0 Send documentation of the action to the
CCPO. This is required according to paragraph 22.
15. Suspension:
a. Purpose and Use (see paragraph 2u):
(1) A suspension, regardless of its duration, is an
adverse action. It is a severe disciplinary action.
Ordinarily, it is the final step in the disciplinary process
before removal action and is accompanied by a warning
to the employee that a further violation of rules could
result in removal. It is important to state such warning
in terms of 'could' rather than 'will' result in removal.
(2) A suspension prevents an employee from
performing work and denies salary for the suspension
period. Therefore, a suspension may not be imposed for
indebtedness or for performance-related factors in
noudisciplinary situations (see paragraph 10).
(3) The period of a suspension is normally
expressed in calendar days. Suspensions seldom should
exceed 30 days unless the indefinite suspension provision
of paragraph 16e<l) ivused.
b. Suspensions for 14 Days or Less, An employee
against whom a suspension for 14 days or less is
proposed is entitled to:
(1) An advance written notice stating the specific
reason(s) for the proposed action (see paragraph 18).

(2) A reasonable .-At to answer orally or in writing or both and to furnish affidavits and other documentary evidence in support of the answer. The employee
normally is given not less than 7 days to answer and
must be given not less than 24 hours.
(3) Representation by an attorney or other
representative (see paragraph 29).
(4) A written decision and the specific reason(s) for
the decision at the earliest practicable date (see paragraph 19).
c. Suspensions for More Than 14 Days. Those suspensions are discussed in paragraph 16.
16. Remoyal, Suspension for More Than 14 Days, Reduction in Grade or Pay, or Furlough for 30 Days or Less.
See paragraph 17 for additional, special procedures
when a reduction in grade is based on reclassification or
job-grading determinations.
a. Actions Included. These actions include but are not
limited to:
(1) Actions based solely on nonperformance related
factors.
(2) Actions that involve both performance and
nonperformance related factors.
(3) Actions not covered by AFR 40-452 that are
based solely on performance -related factors.
b. Remoral.
See paragraph 2s. A disciplinary
removal is the most severe disciplinary action. It is considered rehabilitative even though it severs the Air
Force employee-employer relationship. Although it
precludes improvement in the Air Force position from
which removed, it should help the employee see the
need for improvement in future employment Before
removal is initiated, the facts and circumstances in the
case must be carefully reviewed to ensure they support
the conclusion that the employee has demonstrated
unwillingness or refusal to conform to the rules of
conduct or has so breached the employee -employer relationship that other rehabilitation is not appropriate and
removal is warranted for the offense.
(1) A removal for misconduct may be based upon
the employee's actions on or off the job. It also may be
based on actions before appointment which reflect upon
the employee's suitability for federal employment. Additional information is in attachment 5.
(2) Normally, a progression of disciplinary measures is taken in an effort to rehabilitate an employee
before management decides to remove the individual.
Removal for misconduct after appointment is preceded
by such a progression unless the misconduct is so serious
or the violation of rules and regulations so flagrant that
discharge for m . first or second offense is clearly
warrantexL
c. Furlough for 30 Days or Less. See e below and
paragraph 2h for additional information concerning
furlough. Prior approval of HQ USAF is required
before furlough of any duration may be effected.
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Requests must be submitted through command channels
to OCPO/MPKM and must include the reasor(s)
furlough is considered necessary, efforts made to avoid
the need for furlough, the numbers and skills of employees involved and the length of the proposed furlough.
No announcement of proposed furlough will be made
before approval.
d. Action Requirements. An employee* against whom
an action under this paragraph or paragraph 17 is
proposed is entitled to:
(1) At least 30 days advance written notice, except
as provided in e below (see paragraphs 17 and 18).
(2) A reasonable time, but not less than 7 days, to
answer orally or in writing or both and to furnish
affidavits and other documentary evidence in support of
the answer.
(3) Representation by an attorney or other
representative (see paragraph 29).
(4) A reasonable amount of official time to review
the material relied on to support the proposed action, to
prepare an answer, and to secure affidavits, if the
employee requests time and is otherwise in an active
duty status (see paragraph 30a). However, if the
employee is covered by a collective bargaining agreement, the provisions of that agreement must be followed.
(5) A written decision and the specific reason(s) for
the decision at the earliest practicable date (see paragraph 19).
e. Exceptions. Additional information concerning use
of the following exceptions is in FPM Chapter 752,
Subchapter 3:
(1) Crime Provision. The 30 days advance written
notice is not required when there is reasonable cause to
believe the employee has committed a crime for which a
sentence of imprisonment may be imposed. Management
may require the employee to furnish any answer to the
proposed action that the employee wishes to make and
affidavits and other documentary evidence in support of
the answer within such time as under the circumstances
would be reasonable, but not less than 7 days. When the
circumstances require immediate action, management
may place the employee in a nonduty status with pay for
no longer than 10 calendar days to effect the action.
Generally, to invoke the crime provision and process a
removal or indefinite suspension with a curtailed notice
period, management should:
(a) Notify the employee that he or she is being
placed in a nonduty status with pay for no longer than
10 calendar days.
(b) Issue either a notice of proposed indefinite
suspension pending disposition of the criminal action or
of proposed removal when sufficient evidence is available to warrant removaL
The notice includes
notification of the reasonable period to answer (not less
than 7 days).
(c) Issue a decision on the action after the
employee has had an opportunity to answer and

11
management has considered any answer. Complete this
action before the employee has been in a nonduty status
for more than 10 calendar days.
(2) Furlough Without Pay Due To Unforeseeable
Circumstances. The advance written notice and opportunity to answer are not necessary for furlough without
pay due to unforeseeable circumstances, such as sudden
breakdowns in equipment, acts of God, or sudden
emergencies
requiring
immediate curtailment
of
activities.
Section D-—Change To Lower Grade Based
Reclassification or Job •Grading Determinations

on

17. Change To Lower Grade. This paragraph concerns
the reduction in grade (demotion) of an employee whose
position is downgraded because of a determination that
the position warrants classification at a lower grade due
to a classification error or job grading standard change
when the position has been classified at the higher grade
for less than 1 year. Therefore, it does not apply to an
action which entitles an employee to grade retention
under 5 C.F.R., Part 536 (see paragraph 3b(10)). This
paragraph also does not apply to the demotion of an
emp/oyee whose position is downgraded as a result of
changes in assigned duties and responsibilities (for example, job erosion; restructuring; or deletion of duties);
such demotions are processed under reduction-in-force
procedures.
a.
A determination that a position warrants
reclassification at a lower grade due to a classification
error or job grading standard change concerns the position only and does not necessarily mean that the incumbent also will be changed to a lower grade. When a
position is to be downgraded in such cases, the
employee may be entitled to placement in another position according to AFR 40-300, Filling Positions. If the
employee is to be demoted under the circumstances of
this paragraph, the provisions of paragraphs 16d, 18, and
19 also apply.
b. Contents of Notice of Proposed Adverse Action.
In addition to the requirements of paragraph 18, the
notice of proposed adverse action must:
(1) .Inform the employee why the position is being
downgraded (for example, whether because of an
erroneous classification or because of the application of a
new or revised standard).
(2) Have attached to the notice of proposed
adverse action:
(a) A copy of the official position description.
(b) Either the OPM classification certificate or
the classification decision of the Air Force which, in
either case, must include an analysis that compares the
grade controlling- duties and responsibilities of the position with the applicable published classification or job
grading standards. If it is not feasible because of the
amount of material involved to furnish copies of the
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have access to a negotiated grievance procedure may
grieve those actions through that procedure. Bargaining
unit employees without access to a negotiated grievance
procedure and nonbargaining unit employees may grieve
such actions through the Air Force grievance procedure
in AFR 40-771.
b. Remorais, Suspensions for More Than 14 Days,
Reduction in Grade or Pay, or Furlough for 30 Days or
Less, Except for an individual covered by paragraph 4,
an employee who is a preference eligible or is in the
competitive service may appeal an action covered by
this paragraph to the MSPB or grieve the action
through the negotiated grievance procedure, where
applicable, but not both. A nonpreference eligible in the
excepted service may grieve through the negotiated
grievance procedure, where applicable, or appeal
according to AFR 40-771, but not both.
Section F—Selection of Appropriate Disciplinary Actions
34. Penalty Selection. The determination of which
penalty to impose in a particular situation requires the
application of responsible judgment to Air Force
disciplinary policy. The disciplinary action taken is
based on the conclusions that there is sufficient evidence
available to support the reason(s) for action and that the
action is warranted and reasonable • in terms of the
circumstances which prompted it.
*• GoTerning Criteria. In determining the appropriate
penalty, management observes the principle of 'like
penalties for like offenses in like circumstances/ This
means that penalties will be applied as consistently as
possible considering the particular circumstances of the
cause for disciplinary action. It does not mean that
penalties will be applied with '...mathematical rigidity or
perfect consistency
regardless of variations in
circumstances or changes in prevailing regulations,
standards, or mores,* (Douglas v. Veterans Administration, et al., MSPB Decision No. AT075299OO6, 10 April
1981). The penalty selected should not be disproportionate to the offense, should contribute to the solution
of the problem and to the attainment of an effective
management environment, and should take into consideration ail relevant penalty selection factors.
b. Factors In Penalty Selection. Some of the factors
that may be relevant in selecting the appropriate penalty
are listed below. Not all of the factors will be relevant
in every case and others may be relevant in particular
cases. Selection of an appropriate penaJty involves a
responsible balancing of the relevant factors based on
the individual'case Some of the relevant factors may
weigh in the employee's favor while others may not or
may even cause management to view the situation as
more serious and deserving of a more severe penaltythan originally thought The factors are:
(1) The nature and seriousness of the offense, and
its relation to the employee** duties, position, and
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responsibilities, including whether the offense was intentional or technical or inadvertent, or was committed
maliciously pr for gain, or was frequently repeated.
(2) The employee's job level and type of employment, including supervisory or fiduciary role, contacts
with the public, and prominence of the position.
(3)" The employee's past disciplinary record.*
(4) The employee's past work record, including
length of service, performance on the job, ability to get
along with fellow workers, and dependability.
(5) The effect of the offense upon the employee's
ability to perform at a satisfactory level and its effect
upon supervisors' confidence in the employee's ability to
perform assigned duties.
(6) The consistency of the penalty with those
imposed upon other employees for the same or similar
offenses in like or similar circumstances.
(7) The consistency of the penalty with the Guide
to Disciplinary Actions (attachment 3). I
(8) The notoriety of the offense or its impact upon
the reputation of the Air Force.
(9) The clarity with which the employee was on
notice of any rules that were violated in committing the
offense, or had been warned about the conduct in question.
(10) The potential for the employee's rehabilitation.
(11) The mitigating circumstances surrounding the
offense such as unusual job tensions, personality problems, mental impairment, harassment, or bad faith,
malice or provocation on the part of others involved in
the matter.
(12) The adequacy and effectiveness of alternative
sanctions to deter such conduct in the future by the
employee or others.
c. Penalty Support. If an action is grieved or
appeaied, management must be prepared to support the
appropriateness of the penalty (see paragraph 12b(2)). A
statement of management's reasoning as to the
appropriateness of the penalty imposed must be included
in the record described in paragraph 22.
35. The Guide To Disciplinary Actions (Attachment 3).
The guide helps management select appropriate penalties
by providing a framework for interrelating all the
relevant facts to possible courses of action and to available penalties. It is used to evaluate causes of action
(offenses), whether or not specifically described^ so that a.
sound, supportable penalty may be selected* Mechanical*
use o f ^the^ guide must be avoided" The guide - fa fii
expression^of typical, causes and typical penalties only;
therefore^causes of actioaTand penalties, in.*the^guida
may n o t meet the demands o f all situations^It fa^tq;t>e"
used /as^guidance. along with supervisory judgment In
considering^the; particular: ciroin^tand376f the .matter
and T the^appropriateness ^ of'^the 'particular faction
contemplated.
su Cause of Action. The 'Cause of Action' column in
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1

First Offense

[Second Offense

Third Offense

|

Abuse Prevention and Control Program, are
met. Close consultation with the CCPO, social
actions office, and the base medical services is
J required.
1 9a, Gambling during work -hours.

Reprimand

Reprimand to 5 -Day Reprimand to
Removal
Suspension

1

Reprimand to
Removal

5 -Day Suspension to 10-Day Suspension
to Removal
Removal

Reprimand

Reprimand to
14-Day Suspension

Reprimand to
Removal

5 -Day Suspension to
Removal
Reprimand to
14-Day Suspension

10-Day Suspension
to Removal
Reprimand to
Removal

9b. Promotion of or assisting in operation of
organized gambling on duty or on government
J premises.
1 10a. Loafing or sleeping on duty.

10b. When such action may^resuh in injury, loss Reprimand to
Removal
1 of life, or damage to property.
Reprimand
1 Ha. Possessing, transferring, selling, or using
drug abuse paraphcrnailia as defined in A F R
40-792.
l i b . Use or possession of marijuana, a narcotic,
or dangerous drug on government premises or
on duty. Reporting for duty while under the
influence of marijuana, a narcotic, or dangerous
drug.

1

Reprimand to 5 -Day 5 -Day Suspension to 14-Day Suspension
Suspension
to Removal
Removal

l i e . Being on duty so impaired by marijuana, a Reprimand to
narcotic, or dangerous drug as to be unable to
perform duties properly or to be a hazard to self , Removalor others.
1
Reprimand to
1 Id. Unauthorized sale or transfer of marijuana,
a narcotic, or dangerous drug on government
Removal
premises, or during the duty hours of any person
involved.
NOTE: A dangerous drug is one so defined by
the Attorney General of the United States.
Marijuana is any intoxicating product of the
hemp plant, cannabis (including hashish), or any
synthesis of them. When a narcotic, dangerous
drug, or marijuana has been prescribed for
medical purposes under an appropriate
authority, its use as prescribed is not an offense
under this regulation. The penalty selected
should consider the offender's status as an
experimenter, user, or addict and should,
whenever possible, contribute to his or her
rehabilitation and recovery. Actions involving
those offenses' must be carefully evaluated to
ensure that the requirements of AFR 40-792 are
m e t Coordination with the CCPO, social
actions office, base medical services, and judge
J advocate office is required.
1

14-Day Suspension
to Removal

Removal

Removal
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[First Offense
(Third Offenue
]
[Second Offense
12. Making false, malicious, or unfounded
[Reprimand to
[ 5-Day Suspension to [10 -Day Suspension 1
1 statements against other employees, supervisors, Removal
Removal
to Removal
other officials, or subordinates with the intent to
destroy or damage the reputation, authority or
J official standing of those concerned.
I Reprimand
1 13. Soliciting contributions from other1 Reprimand to
1 Reprimand to
J government officers or employees for gifts or
114 -Day Suspension J Removal
presents to those in superior official positions.
Accepting gifts or presents offered or presented
as contributions from persons in government
employ receiving lower salary (see FRM
J Chapter 735 and AFR 40-735).
1 14. Rude, boisterous play vvhich adversely
Reprimand to
[Reprimand to
1 Reprimand to
I
affects production, discipline or morale; use of
Removal
Removal
Removal
abusive or offensive language; quarreling or
inciting to quarrel; or interfering with the
[
[ production of others.
1 15. Theft, actual or attempted.
Reprimand to
[Reprimand to
15 -Day Suspension to 1
NOTE: Penalty is determined considering value Removal
Removal
Removal
of property and relevant factors as explained in
paragraph 34b.
1 16. Deliberate misrepresentation; falsification,
Reprimand to
Reprimand to
5-Day Suspension to j
exaggeration or concealment of a material fact
Removal
Removal
Removal
in connection with any official document;
withholding of material facts in connection with
1 matters under official investigation; refusal to
testify or cooperate in an inquiry, investigation,
or other official proceeding.
NOTE: For restrictions on salary payment, see
FPM Supplement 990-2, Book 531, Subchapter
S2-7.
17. Fighting, threatening or inflicting bodily
Reprimand to
Reprimand to
5 -Day Suspension to |
harm on another, physical resistance to
Removal
Removal
Removal
competent authority or indecent or immoral
(conduct.
f 18. Discourteous conduct. Includes
( Reprimand to 5 -Day |Reprimand to
1 Reprimand to
(
| discourteous conduct to the public.
Suspension
|
14-Day Suspension | Removal
1 19. Delay or failure to carryout assigned work j Reprimand
j Reprimand to
Reprimand to
1 or instruction in a reasonable period of time.
|
|
5 -Suspension
| Removal
1 20. Insubordinate defiance of authority, refusal jReprimand to
1 Reprimand to
5-Day Suspension to |
to comply with proper orders, wanton disregard J Removal
Removal
j
Removal
1 of directives or insolence.
|
1 21a, Loss of, damage to, unauthorized use or
jReprimand
1 Reprimand to 5 -Day j Reprimand to
|
destruction of property (including motor
Removal
Suspension
1 vehicles and aircraft), records or information,
1
\

*

— — , ,

...

1

21b. When willfulness or intent is involved.
Reprimand to
NOTE: 31 U.S.C. 638a(c)(2) provides that any
Removal
officer or employee who willfully uses or
authorizes use of government passenger motor
vehicles or aircraft for other than official
purposes will be suspended for not less than 1
1 month and will be suspended for a longer period |

Reprimand to
Removal

5 -Day Suspension to
Removal
j
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SPECIFIC DISCIPLINARY AND
1. Substandard Performance of Duties. It is important to
recognize the true character of a substandard
performance problem. That requires a careful evaluation
of the total circumstances surrounding the substandard
work to determine whether the employee is responsible
for the condition and can control the essentials of the
problem.
Appropriate corrective action is not
necessarily disciplinary.
A disciplinary action is
appropriate when the cause(s) of the substandard
performance are within the employee's control and
when it is expected that disciplinary action can motivate
a change in behavior to correct the substandard
performance. .'Other situations^ may result in personnel
actions, including adverse actions, but such actions
should be identifiable as nondisciplinary.
a. If the cause of the unacceptable work is personal to
the employee but is not in the employee's control, the
situation is not disciplinary. For example, unacceptable
performance caused by the employee's inability to
perform no matter how hard the employee tries requires
nondisciplinary treatment. An action based solely on
unacceptable performance is processed under A F R
40-452, if applicable.
b. If the employee has the skills, knowledge, and
capacity to perform well, and fails to do so, the situation
is probably one which calls for a disciplinary action to
clearly inform the employee of management's concern
and to motivate improvement through elimination of the
causes of the substandard performance. Characteristic of
these disciplinary situations are carelessness, negligence,
refusal to perform, performance in a dilatory manner,
loafing, or disregard for policy or procedure. An action
which has a disciplinary component is processed under
this document, as applicable.
2. Medical Incapacity. An adverse action taken because
an employee fails to meet medical standards for retention
in the employee's position is nondisciplinary. Management has the authority and responsibility to make sure
that employees meet medical standards, and employees
are obligated to cooperate. Therefore, an employee can
be disciplined (including removal) for refusal to take a
mandatory medical examination.
3. Functional Transfer. While failure to accompany a
position in a functional transfer is both personal to the
employee and within the employee's control,. adverse
actions in such cases are nondisciplinary.
4. Failure To Apply For and Accept Return Assignment
According To Orersea Employment Agreement 'Failure
to honor an oversea employment agreement by not
applying for and accepting rccurn assignment according
t a the terms of the agreement is a nondisciplinary basis
for separation.
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NONDISCIPLINAJRY

SITUATIONS

5, Preappointment Considerations. Sometimes, after an
employee is appointed, information is developed about
the employee's conduct or health which raises a question
as to the desirability of the employee's retention.
a. When such information was fully disclosed and
reviewed by the Air Force appointing officer or by the
OPM before the employee's appointment, disciplinary
action is not appropriate solely on the basis of such
previously disclosed preappointment information.
b. If the information was not known or disclosed
before appointment, disciplinary action may be \x ^en for
such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service*
Generally, an employee who is serving under other than
a temporary appointment may not be removed unless the
preappointment consideration would have been material
in preventing the employee's appointment (see guidance
in FPM Supplement 731 -1).
6, Drug or Alcohol Abuse:
a. The Department of the Air Force Drug and
Alcohol Abuse Prevention and Control Program, A F R
40-792, gives nondisciplinary procedures for offering
rehabilitative assistance for drug or alcohol abuse problems. Drug or alcohol abuse involves the personal use
of those substances. See AFR 40-792, Drug and
Alcohol Abuse Prevention and Control, for further
explanations of the terms. Except as provided in b
below, when the supervisor has good reason to believe
that the cause of a job-related problem may be drug or
alcohol abuse, the supervisor will postpone initiation of
contemplated disciplinary or adverse action under this
publication pending referral of the employee for
interview according to AFR 40-792, attachment 3, paragraph 2f(2). The contemplated disciplinary action • or
adverse action will be postponed for a reasonable time to
allow the employee to improve provided the employee
reports for the interview; the supervisor knows that the
employee is enrolled in an approved rehabilitative
program; and the employee is progressing satisfactorily.
(See AJFR 40-792, attachment 3, paragraph 7c for an
explanation of 'reasonable time.*) If the employee does
not report for the interview, the supervisor may proceed
with the contemplated disciplinary or adverse action, as
applicable,
b., .Adverse action need not be postponed If placement
of the employee in a leave "status is- not appropriate: and
retention of the employee in a duty stata might result in
damage? to - government property ~orrper«)naL injurycto
the: e m p l o V e e f o r : b t h e » ^ A d v ^ ^
postponed* if. theTTJnmeprovdaion^
in- paragraph
16e(l) is invoked.
c'fjOne referral "of _the employee* for interview c under
AFR.40-79Vattachment.3, paragraph 2fl(2) meets*the
Air Force obligation to advise the employee of the availability of rehabilitative assistance. Therefore,- the
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employee need not be referred for inte. ,ew under AFR
40-792 again before disciplinary or adverse action may
b e . taken for misconduct, delinquency, or another
job-related problem that occurs or is brought to the
employee's attention after the date established for the
initial interview.
dL Participation in a rehabilitative program does not
exempt an employee from disciplinary or adverse action
for reason(s) that occur after the initial referral for
interview according to AFR 40-792, attachment 3, paragraph 2f(2), nor for reason(s) unrelated to drug or
alcohol abuse.
7. Motor Vehicle Operator. Disciplinary and adverse
actions against individuals assigned to operator and incidental operator positions must be according to applicable laws and regulations. Thtf- following grounds are
among those constituting sufficient cause of action
against operators and incidental operators:
a* The employee is convicted of operating under the
influence of narcotics.
b. The employee is convicted of leaving the scene of
an accident without making himself or herself known.
c. A federal medical officer finds the employee fails to
meet the required physical standards.
d. The employee's state license is revoked.
e. The employee's state license is suspended. The
employee may be continued in his or her position for not
to exceed 45 days from the date of suspension of the
state license, for operation on other than public highways. This is to permit continuance of an employee in a
position for which a currently valid state license is
required where it is probable that the employee will
have his or her state license restored within the 45 -day
period. If it is apparent from the nature of the suspension that the state license is not likely to be restored
within the 45 days, the employee should be immediately
barred from the operation of a motor vehicle. Additional guidance is in FPM Chapter 930, Subchapter 1.
8, Misuse of Leare. Since management has the discretion to approve or deny most requests for leave, the
general rule is that management may not take action
based on an employee's use of approved leave, whether it
be sick leave, annual leave, or leave without pay (see
exceptions in b below). Use of accrued sick leave in the
absence of fraud or subterfuge, is an entitlement of every
employee who is ill or incapacitated by injury, and an
approval is contingent on submission of supporting
evidence acceptable to management The right of the
employee to take sick leave for nonemergency examinations is subject ta requesting this leave in advance, with
the approval of the proposed time subject to the need
for* the employee's services.
When management
approves an employee's request for leave, the approving
official presumably makes a determination that the
employee's presence on the job is not required. If

management needs th
nployee's services, it may deny
leave and if the employee does not report for duty, show
the absence in time and attendance reports as absence
without leave (AWOL). Neither the denial of leave nor
the time and attendance reporting entry of-AWOL is
punitive, and neither means that the employee has
insufficient reason for requesting leave. Rather, they
mean that the employee's presence is required and that
the reason for requesting leave is not one for which
leave must be approved. The employee's failure to
honor the leave denial and the unauthorized absence
may form the basis for disciplinary or adverse action.
a* If management has in the past approved an
employee's leave but believes that the extent of the leave
used is such that the employee is not on duty on a regular, full-time or part-time basis in a position which
requires a regular, full -time or part -time employee, or if
the employee has consistently failed to obtain advance
approval for leave, management has the opportunity to
establish an appropriate record as part of a basis for
further action by:
(1) Informing the employee that his or her
attendance record is unsatisfactory and needs to be
improved.
(2) Warning the employee that further sick leave
will not be approved without sufficient medical documentation and that annua] leave and leave without pay
(LWOP) will be approved only if requested in advance
and the employee's services are not essential during the
period for which the leave is requested.
NOTE: If the employee is then absent without prior
approval or proper medical documentation, management
may record the employee's absence as AWOL. Such
unauthorized absence may serve as a basis for
disciplinary or adverse action.
b. Exception to the General Rule. Adverse action
may be taken based on a record of excessive
unscheduled LWOP when three criteria are met:
(1) The record shows that the employee was absent
for compelling reasons beyond the employee's control so
that management approval or disapproval was
immaterial because the employee could not be on the
job.
(2) The absence or absences continued beyond a
reasonable time and the employee was warned that
adverse action might be initiated unless the employee
became available for duty on a regular, full-time or
part -time basis.
(3) Management showed that the position needed
to be filled by an employee available for duty on a regular, full -time, or part -time basis.
NOTE: This exception would be applicable only under
certain unusual circumstances such as the inability of an
employee to return to duty or to work on a regular basis
because of the continuing effects of illness or injury (on
or off-the-job). Other circumstances may, in rare cases,
meet these criteria. This exception would probably not
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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORcc
HEADQUARTERS OGDEN AIR LOGISTICS CENTER (AFLC)
HILL AIR FORCE BASE, UTAH 84056-5990

RtPLY TO
ATTN O r

SUBJECT

TO

cc

20 November 1989

Actions Against Civilians Involved in Drug Offenses

Commanders, Directors, Chiefs of Staff Offices, 00-ALC; Div Chiefs, 2849 ABG;
and Tenant Commanders
1.

I strongly endor-se the attached HQ AFLC/CV letter regarding this subject.

2. I expect increased efforts on the part of all concerned to ensure that
all available measures are taken to wage this war on drugs,
to include
criminal prosecution and the most severe administrative discipline which in
most cases will lead to removal from Air Force employment. This will require
the combined efforts of DPC, JA, AFOSI, SP, and all supervisors.
3. Let all be on notice, that this Center and this Command will not tolerate
the use, possession or distribution of illegal drugs by its civilian
employees, whether on or off base.
4. The contents of the attached letter and this reannounced policy should
be made known to all civilian personnel so that there can be no question as
to what can be expected by those involved in drug offenses.

/pAMES W. '»
> /Major GenevaJ
/ / Commander

USA*

1 Atch
HQ AFLC/CV L t r , 29 Sep 89
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•u.jccTr Disciplinary Action For Drug Offenses

*©» All AFLC Commanders
1, In his re^ept pglicy statement, General Hansen reiterated that AFLC has a
zero tolerance for drugs and employees who abuse drugs—drug abuse should not,
can not, and will not be tolerated. With this policy in mind, commanders,
supervisors, and staff agencies should take svift and sure action to ensure an
appropriate level of discipline is imposed on all drug offenders.
2, You and your supervisors have wide latitude in determining the appropriate
action to initiate in response to drug offenses. However, recent drug
incidents involving members of our civilian work force indicate a reluctance
on the part of some to exercise the full range of their authority. For
example, it may be appropriate to initiate removal action against a first time
drug offender, even though AFR 40-750 currently suggests no more than a five
day suspension. In this regard, it is important to note that the recommended
range of disciplinary actions are in effect guidelines, and not a restriction
on your authority to take appropriate disciplinary action.
3, Disciplinary action must be consistent with rehabilitation efforts, and is
an integral part of the rehabilitation process. The current AFR 40-750
suggests postponement of contemplated disciplinary action may be appropriate
in some circumstances to allow the employee to enter and progress in a
rehabiliation program. However, this portion of the regulation appears
inconsistent with the most recent Merit System Protection Board cases and is
in the process of being revised. Therefore, volunteering for, entering, and
completing a rehabilitation program does not mean a commander or supervisor
should refrain from or postpone taking disciplinary action. Such action may
very well complement the overall rehabilitation effort.

4. We have the necessary tools at our disposal to carry out the AFLC policy
in regard to drug abuse. It is up to each of us to use those too^s.

ROBERT P. McCOY
Lieutenant General, USAF
Vice "Commander
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AFLC D r u g A b u s e

TO. AZCLC
AFCMC
AFLMC
AGMC

Policy^

ALD
AhARC
CASC
ILC

LMSC
LOC
OC-ALC
OO-ALC

SA-ALC
SM-ALC
USAF Med Cen
WPCC

WR-ALC
2 7 5 0 ABW

(Commander)
T h e P r e s i c e r . t ' s r e c e n t a d d r e s s t o t n e n a t i o n on t n e
s e r i o u s n e s s c f t h e d r u g a b u s e p r o b l e m i s a r e m i n d e r t o a i l AFLC
m i l i t a r y and c i v i l i a n p e r s o n n e l of t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o combat
drug a b u s e .
I n s u p p o r t c f t h e P r e s i d e n t , I w a n t t o r e s t a t e my
p o l i c y as i t r e l a t e s to drug abuse.

u n i m p a i r e d by i n t o x i c a n t s o r o t h e r i l l e g a l d r u g s a n d t o - n o t
t o l e r a t e d r u g a b u s e by o t h e r s .
T h o s e who d o n o t a b i d e b y t h i s
p o l i c y s u b j e c t t h e m s e l v e s t o c r i m i n a l p r o s e c u t i o n a s w e l l as
d i s c i p l i n a r y action i n c l u d i n g job l o s s .
3.
AFLC h a s an i m p o r t a n t a n d d e m a n d i n g m i s s i o n t h a t c a n o n l y b e
s u c c e s s f u l l y a c c o m p l i s h e d b y p e o p l e f r e e f r o m t h e e f f e c t s of d r u g
u r g e e v e r y o n e i n AFLC t o s t r o n g l y s u p p o r t t h i s p o l i c y .
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